This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Economics of Spousal Support

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Samuel A. Rea, Jr.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The introduction of "no-fault" divorce in most of North America has eliminated the traditional basis for spousal support without providing a satisfactory alternative. Women who have reduced their labor force participation to look after a home and raise children are particularly disadvantaged by divorce. Recent cases and legal scholarship have attempted to find ways of recognizing the investment that a woman has made in the family and in her husband's career. In a recent case, Elliot v. Elliot, an Ontario court awarded the woman half of the difference between her earnings had she not married and her earnings after the divorce. A logical extension of the case would also award her half of any increase in his earnings resulting from the marriage. The model developed in this paper highlights the changes in earnings that result from specialization in housework or market work, investment in children, and investment in the spouse's human capital. The efficiency of marriage matches and divorce are also analyzed. Many alternative concepts of spousal support are presented within the framework of the model, and the incentive effects on human capital, marriage, and divorce are considered. Although no measure is perfect, the paper concludes that the approach taken in Elliot, adjusted for additional leisure enjoyed during marriage, offers a reasonable compromise between competing objectives. Property division is also considered within the same framework.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.economics.utoronto.ca/files/UT-ECIPA-REAS-95-01.ps
File Format: application/postscript
File Function: MainText
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://repec.economics.utoronto.ca/files/UT-ECIPA-REAS-95-01.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: MainText
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number reas-95-01.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:reas-95-01

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
Phone: (416) 978-5283
Fax: (416) 978-6713

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (RePEc Maintainer).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sander, William, 1985. "Women, Work, and Divorce," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 519-23, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David Neumark & Sanders D. Korenman, 1988. "Does marriage really make men more productive?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 29, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  4. Allen, Douglas W., 1990. "An inquiry into the state's role in marriage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 171-191, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sheila Eastman, 1992. "Improving Outcomes for Divorced Women," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 18(3), pages 318-326, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Farrell, Joseph & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1988. "Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 279-97, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polacheck, 1974. "Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 397-431 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  8. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-54, June.
  9. Daniel, K., 1991. "Does Marriage Make Men More Productive?," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 92-2, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
  10. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 268-92, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Fethke, Carol C, 1984. "An Economic Model of Asset Division in the Dissolution of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 265-70, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, 1974. "Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," NBER Chapters, in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 76-110 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
  14. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1993. "Transfers among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 629-79, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Zelder, Martin, 1993. "Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 503-20, June.
  16. Borenstein, Severin & Cournat, Paul N, 1989. "How to Carve a Medical Degree: Human Capital Assets in Divorce Settlements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 992-1009, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.