On Markov perfect equilibria in baseball
AbstractWe formulate baseball as a finite Markov game with approximately 3.5 million states. The manager of each opposing team is the player who maximizes the probability of their team winning. We derive, using dynamic programming, a recursive formula which is satisfied by Markov perfect equilibria and the value functions of the game for both teams. By solving this recursive formula, we can obtain optimal strategies for each condition. We demonstrate with numerical experiments that these can be calculated in approximately 1 second per game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University in its series TMARG Discussion Papers with number 115.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2014
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2014-04-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SPO-2014-04-18 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Turocy Theodore L., 2008. "In Search of the "Last-Ups" Advantage in Baseball: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-20, April.
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