Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization: New Efficiency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
AbstractRandomization is an effective way of extracting information from a limited number of observations, as random auditing shows. We employ this idea to support efficient outcomes in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, when information is severely limited. In particular, we show that efficiency can be improved when the players randomize and condition their future actions both on the signal and their actions. Firstly, we show that in a version of Radner, Myerson and Maskin's example of inefficient partnership, efficiency can be achieved by such (i.e., privately mixed strategy) equilibria. Secondly, we show that the folk theorem under imperfect public monitoring can be extended to the case with a small signal space by means of mixed strategy equilibria with communication. In particular, we show that for generic symmetric games with at least four players, we can drop the Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin condition on the number of actions and signals altogether and prove the folk theorem under the same condition as in the perfect monitoring case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-45.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: May 1999
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1999-07-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1999-07-28 (Microeconomics)
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- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
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