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An Economic Analysis of Public Transfers

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Author Info
Toshihiro Ihori (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.)
Abstract

This paper develops simple models of public transfers. The sources of income inequality are differences in ability and in luck. The government employs a redistribution policy due to altruistic motives in the case of ability differences. We consider the case there the government reoptimizes income inequality is differences in luck, the economy creates a mutual insurance or provides public goods due to risk sharing motives. We derive a paradoxical result that a more able individual would not enjoy higher welfare than a less able individual. We also investigate how public transfers react to increases in income level and income inequality.

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File URL: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/98/cf18/contents.htm
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Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-18.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1998
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Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:98cf18

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alesina, A. & Perotti, R., 1995. "Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions," Discussion Papers 1995_29, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  2. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1987. "The optimal linear income tax : A diagrammatic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 379-390, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1996. "International public goods and contribution productivity differentials," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 139-154, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Shibata, Hirofumi, 1971. "A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(1), pages 1-29, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Boadway, Robin & Pestieau, Pierre & Wildasin, David, 1989. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 157-176, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Toshihiro Ihori, 1997. "Protection against National Emergency: International Public Goods and Insurance," CIRJE F-Series 97-F-38, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  9. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1994. "The comparative static properties of the impure public good model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 403-421, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions," NBER Working Papers 4992, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1994. "Immiserizing growth with interregional externalities of public goods," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 485-496, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1992. "Impure public goods and transfers in a three-agent model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 385-401, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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