Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
AbstractThe present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players. Our results in particular show that for generic symmetric games with at least four players, we can drop the FLM condition on the number of actions and signals altogether and prove the folk theorem under the same condition as in the perfect monitoring case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-139.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
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- Kandori Michihiro, 2003. "Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 345-353, January.
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- Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Li, Rui, 2010. "Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 322-326, September.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
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