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Using Taylor Rule to Explain Effects of Institutional Changes in Central Banks

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Author Info
Aleksandra Maslowska (Department of Economics and Public Choice Research Centre, University of Turku)

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Abstract

In this paper we trace changes in monetary policy caused by institutional amendments in legal acts of central banks. We estimate coefficients of the Taylor Rule for central banks of Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and EU15 to shed some light on monetary policy ex ante and ex post significant improvements in central bank independence. Results presented suggest differences in accommodating monetary policy in countries and support the idea that initial level of CBI matters for reactions to variability both of inflation and output gap. A preindependence period characterizes with strong inflation targeting features, whereas a post-independence time resembles more discretionary type of monetary policy. As a spin-off from our original idea, we find that changing properties of inflation in the last decade make econometric analysis more difficult

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 46.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp46

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Related research
Keywords: Taylor rule; central bank independence; interest rate rules;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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  1. Stephan Sauer & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2007. "Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary Policy," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8, pages 375-398, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules And Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence And Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2005. "Targeting versus instrument rules for monetary policy: what is wrong with McCallum and Nelson?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 613-626. [Downloadable!]
  6. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Robert L. Hetzel, 2000. "The Taylor rule : is it a useful guide to understanding monetary policy?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 1-33. [Downloadable!]
  8. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Athanasios Orphanides, 2003. "Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alexander Mihailov, 2006. "Operational independence, inflation targeting, and UK monetary policy," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 28(3), pages 395-421, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2004. "Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and Inflation: A View from the Trenches," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(2), pages 151-75, April.
    Other versions:
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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