The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking
AbstractShadowy banking is safety-net arbitrage. It employs substitutes for products and activities performed within the traditional banking sector. The shadows obscure organizational and transactions strategies that avoid regulation and extract subsidies by adaptive innovation. Because credit support kicks in when private equity is exhausted, safety nets supply badly structured equity capital-- and not insurance-- to firms that engage in shadowy activities. As coerced equity investors whose liability is unlimited, taxpayers would benefit if information systems and corporate law were revised to give them much the same safeguards and rights of disclosure as a minority shareholder.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) in its series INET Research Notes with number 25.
Date of creation: 22 Apr 2013
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- Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
- Kenneth A. Carow & Edward J. Kane & Rajesh P. Narayanan, 2011. "Safety‐Net Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(7), pages 1371-1398, October.
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