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Conventions and the European Periphery

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  • Stephen Kinsella
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    Abstract

    The European periphery is qualitatively different from the core. This im- plies that a monetary and scal policy mix which bene ts the core will not, by de nition, bene t the periphery except by coincident or accident. The debtor nations are also qualitatively different from the creditor nations. There is a distinct, but not total, overlap between the core and creditor countries, and between the peripheral and debtor countries. The (biased) case for the periphery is made in this article.

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    Paper provided by Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) in its series INET Research Notes with number 21.

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    Date of creation: 01 Dec 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:thk:rnotes:21

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    1. Giovanni Dosi & Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2006. "An Evolutionary Model of Endogenous Business Cycles," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 3-34, February.
    2. Boyer, Robert & Orlean, Andre, 1992. "How Do Conventions Evolve?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 165-77, October.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-95, May.
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