Conventions and the European Periphery
AbstractThe European periphery is qualitatively different from the core. This im- plies that a monetary and scal policy mix which bene ts the core will not, by de nition, bene t the periphery except by coincident or accident. The debtor nations are also qualitatively different from the creditor nations. There is a distinct, but not total, overlap between the core and creditor countries, and between the peripheral and debtor countries. The (biased) case for the periphery is made in this article.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) in its series INET Research Notes with number 21.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2012
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