Trust, reciprocity and altruism: An impossible addition
AbstractThis paper attempts to measure conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences in two versions of an investment game: a canonical one and a cheap-talk variant where some pre-play is also allowed (i.e., non-binding unilateral messages). We find that counter-factual measures, as the well-known triadic design (Cox, 2004 [G&EB]) may systematically fail in distinguishing between conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences due to the existence of frame effects. Specifically, by using indirect methods, we document conditional other-regarding preferences that are systematically neglected by the triadic approach. By inspecting result from the cheap-talk variant of the game, we also find that messages have no effect on average, but they affect the participants’ behavior leading to a polarization of their choices.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 0082.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://wp.comunite.it/
Conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences; trust; reciprocity; investment game; frame effect; polarization effect; cheap talk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-11-01 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-11-01 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-11-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-11-01 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2011-11-01 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McCabe, Kevin A. & Rigdon, Mary L. & Smith, Vernon L., 2003. "Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 267-275, October.
- Charness, Gary B & Rabin, Matthew, 2001.
"Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
qt0dc3k4m5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August.
- Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3d04q5sm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
- Michael Berlemann & Marcus Dittrich & Gunther Markwardt, 2004.
"The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments: Some Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1352, CESifo Group Munich.
- Berlemann, Michael & Dittrich, Marcus & Markwardt, Gunther, 2009. "The value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments: Some theory and experimental evidence," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 421-428, June.
- Markwardt, Gunther & Dittrich, Marcus & Berlemann, Michael, 2004. "The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments: some Theory and Experimental Evidence," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 03/04, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Marco Mantovani, 2011.
"The effect of motivations on social indirect reciprocity: an experimental analysis,"
Applied Economics Letters,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(17), pages 1709-1711.
- Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Marco Mantovani, 2009. "The Effect of Motivations on Social Indirect Reciprocity: an Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 169, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2009.
- Janssen, Maarten C. W. & Mendys-Kamphorst, Ewa, 2004. "The price of a price: on the crowding out and in of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 377-395, November.
- Benedetto Gui & Luca Stanca, 2010. "Happiness and relational goods: well-being and interpersonal relations in the economic sphere," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 105-118, June.
- Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Luca Corazzini, 2007.
"Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Do Motivations Matter?,"
109, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 2007.
- Stanca, Luca & Bruni, Luigino & Corazzini, Luca, 2009. "Testing theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 233-245, August.
- COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In The Battle Of The Sexes Game," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
- Stewart, Hamish, 1992. "Rationality and the market for human blood," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 125-143, October.
- V. Pelligra, 2011. "Empathy, Guilt-Aversion and Patterns of Reciprocity," Working Paper CRENoS 201108, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Di Bartolomeo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.