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Tempered Best Response Dynamics

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Author Info

  • Dai Zusai

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Temple University)

Abstract

We propose a new deterministic evolutionary dynamic—the tempered best response dynamic (tBRD)---to capture two features of economic decision making: optimization and continuous sensitivity to incentives. That is, in the tBRD, an agent is more likely to revise his action when his current payoff is further from the optimal payoff, and he always switches to an optimal action when revising. The tBRD is a payoff monotone selection like the replicator dynamic, which makes medium and long-run outcomes more consistent with predictions from equilibrium refinement than the BRD in some situations. The technical contribution of the tBRD is continuous sensitivity, which allows us to apply results of a system of piecewise differential equations in order to obtain conditions for uniqueness and stability of solutions.

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File URL: http://www.cla.temple.edu/RePEc/documents/DETU_13_01.pdf
File Function: First version, 2013
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Temple University in its series DETU Working Papers with number 1301.

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Date of creation: Jan 2013
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Handle: RePEc:tem:wpaper:1301

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Keywords: best response dynamic; payoff monotonicity; status-quo bias; switching costs; proper equilibrium; piecewise differential equations;

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