The Effects Of Fiscal And Monetary Discipline On Budgetary Outcomes
AbstractThis paper extends the game-theoretic model of Von Hagen and Harden (1995) that analyzes the impact of fiscal discipline on budgetary outcomes.It analyzes the effects on budgetary outcomes of both fiscal and monetary discipline, which are evaluated with respect to the relevant institutional rules. The model predicts that while both inflation and budget deficits are negatively associated with fiscal discipline, they may be positively associated with monetary discipline, proxied by central bank independence. This result obtains due to optimizing agents who internalize the burden of spending: inflation. Although not conclusive due to data limitations, the empirical findings of the paper support these predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Turkish Economic Association in its series Working Papers with number 2003/1.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Budget Deficits; Central Bank Independence; Fiscal Discipline; Inflation;
Other versions of this item:
- Bilin Neyapti & Secil Ozgur, 2007. "The Effects Of Fiscal And Monetary Discipline On Budgetary Outcomes," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(2), pages 146-155, 04.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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