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Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others

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  • Guillén, Pablo
  • Hakimov, Rustamdjan

Abstract

We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2014-01.

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Date of creation: Jan 2014
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Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9951

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  11. Haruvy, Ernan & Utku Unver, M., 2007. "Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 284-289, February.
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  13. John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, 2000. "The Dynamics Of Reorganization In Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated By A Natural Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 201-235, February.
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  15. Shane Frederick, 2005. "Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 25-42, Fall.
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