Cheap talk and editorial control
AbstractThis paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze 2-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given: it is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders' preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver and that they both have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-01.
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Wikipedia; editorial control; Cheap talk;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-02-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-03 (Microeconomics)
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