Children as Family Public Goods: Some Implications for Fertility
AbstractA two-stage bargaining model is developed to describe how fertility decisions are made in a strategic family setting. Given the assumption that family contracts are incomplete and cannot be used to enforce optimal behavior, it is shown that investments in children (i.e. the fertility rate) may be sub-optimal. This is because the woman may find it in her interest to invest too little in children in stage 1 of the model in order to protect her bargaining status in stage 2. I then consider in the context of this model the impact on fertility rates of changes in child custody rules (in the case of divorce), the wage rate, and the male-female wage differential. I conclude by exploring how the introduction of child subsidies can change the results.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009-04.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Australian School of Business Building, Sydney 2052
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Family bargaining; Fertility; Child subsidies; Labor Participation Rate;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-HAP-2009-07-03 (Economics of Happiness)
- NEP-LAB-2009-07-03 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gunderson, Morley, 1989. "Male-Female Wage Differentials and Policy Responses," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 46-72, March.
- Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M & Tamura, Robert, 1990.
"Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S12-37, October.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy & Robert F. Tamura, 1990. "Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 3414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy & Robert Tamura, . "Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 90-5a, Chicago - Population Research Center.
- Philip A. Trostel, 2004. "Returns to scale in producing human capital from schooling," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 461-484, July.
- Daniel Sullivan, 1997. "Trends in real wage growth," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Mar.
- David Card & John E. DiNardo, 2002.
"Skill Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles,"
NBER Working Papers
8769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Card & John E. DiNardo, 2002. "Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 733-783, October.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000.
"Tranfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem,"
CHILD Working Papers
wp02_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Transfers to Families with Children as a Principal-Agent Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 351, CESifo Group Munich.
- Mukesh Eswaran, 2002. "The empowerment of women, fertility, and child mortality: Towards a theoretical analysis," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 433-454.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Betsey Stevenson, 2006.
"The impact of divorce laws on marriage-specific capital,"
Working Paper Series
2006-43, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Betsey Stevenson, 2007. "The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 75-94.
- Pollak, Robert A, 1985. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 581-608, June.
- Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2007. "Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 138-155, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriele Gratton).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.