Monetary Policy Coordination Revisited in a Two-Bloc DSGE Model
AbstractWe reassess the gains from monetary policy coordination within the confines of the canonical NOEM in the light of three issues. First, the literature uses a number of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium concepts that do not always clearly distinguish commitment and discretionary outcomes, and in some cases adopts inappropriate concepts. Second, our analysis is welfare based. Moreover, as with much of this literature, we adopt a linear-quadratic approximation of the actual non-linear non-quadratic stochastic optimization problem facing the monetary policymakers. Our second objective then is to re-assess welfare gains using an accurate approximation for such a problem, a feature that for the most part is lacking in previous studies. Finally, we examine the issue where the monetary authority is restricted to rules that are operational in two senses: first, the zero lower bound constraint is imposed on the optimal rule and second, we study simple Taylor-type commitment rules that unlike fully optimal rules are easily monitored by the public.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of Surrey in its series School of Economics Discussion Papers with number 0907.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
monetary rules; open economy; coordination games; commitment; discretion; zero bound constraint;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-10-27 (Central Banking)
- NEP-DGE-2007-10-27 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2007-10-27 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2007-10-27 (Monetary Economics)
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- Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph G. & Pierse, Richard, 2007.
"Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules,"
Working Paper Series
0759, European Central Bank.
- Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph & Pierse, Richard, 2008. "Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3315-3349, October.
- Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Peter Welz, 2008. "Robust Inflation-Targeting Rules and the Gains from International Policy Coordination," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0208, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
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