Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting
AbstractWe study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogenous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting, we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior, the model has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) that is free from several non-plausible features of the PSNE under deterministic voting. The results are robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-2.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Probabilistic voting; valence; three-candidate competition; centripetal incentives;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-02-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-02-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-02-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Evrenk, Haldun, 2010. "Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization," Working Papers 2010-1, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
- Haldun Evrenk & Dmitriy Kha, 2011. "Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 421-438, June.
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