Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization
AbstractI study both local and global Nash equilibria of a model of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition. In the model, candidates may have different non-policy characteristics (valence). Generalizing the base model studied in Evrenk (2009a;b) the model allows for an asymmetric voter density as well as plurality-maximizing candidates. Unlike the standard Hotelling-Downs model of multi-candidate competition, under an asymmetric density with (heterogenous) vote-maximizing candidates a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) exists. Further, this PSNE is free from several non-plausible features of PSNE under a symmetric density. When candidates are plurality-maximizers, some of the PSNE are supported by paradoxical candidate behavior. Further, when voter density is asymmetric and candidates are plurality-maximizers, there are several non-monotonicities in the PSNE.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-1.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Valence; three-candidate competition; plurality maximization; local Nash equilibrium; asymmetric voter density;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-02-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-02-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-02-13 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-02-13 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Evrenk, Haldun & Kha, Dmitriy, 2010. "Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting," Working Papers 2010-2, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
- Evrenk, Haldun, 2008.
"Three-Candidate Competition when Candidates Have Valence: The Base Case,"
2008-2, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
- Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 169-169, January.
- Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 157-168, January.
- Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March.
- Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. " Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
- Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2009. "Elections with platform and valence competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 191-216, September.
- Haldun Evrenk & Dmitriy Kha, 2011. "Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 421-438, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frank Conte).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.