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Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization

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  • Evrenk, Haldun

    ()
    (Suffolk University, Economics)

Abstract

I study both local and global Nash equilibria of a model of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition. In the model, candidates may have different non-policy characteristics (valence). Generalizing the base model studied in Evrenk (2009a;b) the model allows for an asymmetric voter density as well as plurality-maximizing candidates. Unlike the standard Hotelling-Downs model of multi-candidate competition, under an asymmetric density with (heterogenous) vote-maximizing candidates a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) exists. Further, this PSNE is free from several non-plausible features of PSNE under a symmetric density. When candidates are plurality-maximizers, some of the PSNE are supported by paradoxical candidate behavior. Further, when voter density is asymmetric and candidates are plurality-maximizers, there are several non-monotonicities in the PSNE.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-1.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-1

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Web page: http://www.suffolk.edu/college/2175.html
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Related research

Keywords: Valence; three-candidate competition; plurality maximization; local Nash equilibrium; asymmetric voter density;

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References

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  1. Evrenk, Haldun & Kha, Dmitriy, 2010. "Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting," Working Papers 2010-2, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
  2. Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 169-169, January.
  3. Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March.
  4. Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2009. "Elections with platform and valence competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 191-216, September.
  5. Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. " Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Haldun Evrenk & Dmitriy Kha, 2011. "Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 421-438, June.

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