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On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms

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  • Evrenk, Haldun

    ()
    (Suffolk University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Using a theoretical model of two-candidate political competition under probabilistic voting, I study the effectiveness of the following anti-corruption reforms: (i) higher wages for politicians, (ii) higher penalties for political corruption, and (iii) constitutional constraints on the tax rates and the public good levels. In the setup I study, the competing candidates may differ in their popularity, (non-verifiable) ability, and corruptibility. I find that the reforms are more likely to be effective when the candidates are (almost) identical. When the candidates differ significantly from each other, each reform may increase equilibrium level of corruption or reduce voters' welfare.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-5.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 15 May 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-5

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Web page: http://www.suffolk.edu/college/2175.html
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Related research

Keywords: Anti-Corruption Reform; Political Corruption; Constitutional Constraints;

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References

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  1. Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "Bad politicians," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 134, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
    • Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2003. "Paying Politicians," Working Papers 246, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  3. Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  4. Michele Polo, . "Electoral competition and political rents," Working Papers 144, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  5. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293, April.
  6. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  8. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption," Working Papers 2008-3, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
  9. John Douglas Wilson, 1989. "An Optimal Tax Treatment Of Leviathan," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 97-117, 07.
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Cited by:
  1. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.

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