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Three-Candidate Competition when Candidates Have Valence: The Base Case

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Author Info
Evrenk, Haldun () (Suffolk University, Department of Economics)

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Abstract

We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when candidates differ in their non-policy characteristics (valence). If the voters' policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function, and if the voter density is unimodal and symmetric, then a unique, modulo symmetry, local Nash Equilibrium exists under fairly plausible conditions. The global Nash Equilibrium, however, exists when only one candidate has a valence advantage (or disadvantage) while the other two candidates have the same valence

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Paper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-2.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 31 Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-2

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Web page: http://www.suffolk.edu/college/2175.html
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Related research
Keywords: Multi-candidate competition; valence; local Nash Equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other

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  1. Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. " Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hug, Simon, 1995. " Third Parties in Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 159-80, January.
  3. Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kwang-ho Kim, 2005. "Valence characteristics and entry of a third party," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(18), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
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