Mafia in the ballot box
AbstractWe study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. Assuming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in exchange of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the mafia. Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946-1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1325.
Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2013
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Publication status: Published
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D72; K42; H42;
Other versions of this item:
- Giuseppe De Feo & Giacomo De Luca, 2013. "Mafia in the ballot box," DEM Working Papers Series 057, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
- De Feo, Giuseppe & De Luca, Giacomo, 2013. "Mafia in the ballot box," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-104, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
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