Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts

Contents:

Author Info

  • Balkenborg, D.
  • Jansen, M.
  • Vermeulen, D.

Abstract

Kohlberg and Mertens argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition of deletion of an equivalent strategy and not require the use of weakly dominated strategies. In this paper we study which of these requirements are satisfied by Kalai and Samet's concepts of persistent equilibria and persistent retracts. While none of these concepts has all the invariance properties, we show that a slight rephrasing of the notion of a persisent retract leads to a notion satisfying them all.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 9806.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:9806

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ
Phone: (+44) 23 80592537
Fax: (+44) 23 80593858
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  2. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1994. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," NBER Technical Working Papers 0151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. MERTENS, Jean-François, . "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 479, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  6. Vermeulen, A. J. & Jansen, M. J. M., 2000. "Ordinality of solutions of noncooperative games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 13-34, February.
  7. Mertens, J.-F., 1987. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Vermeulen, A. J. & Jansen, M. J. M., 1997. "On the invariance of solutions of finite games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 251-267, June.
  9. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-93, November.
  10. repec:fth:coluec:9596-22 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  12. Sims, Christopher A, 1980. "Macroeconomics and Reality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(1), pages 1-48, January.
  13. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2008. "Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 0806, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  2. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2011. "Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics," Working Papers 451, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:9806. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Thorn).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.