Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization
AbstractSeveral studies stressed that contrary to the initial expectations, state-owned firms at the beginning of the transition, undertook painful measures to adjust to the new economic environment. This paper investigates this behaviour in a simple game theoretic framework. It is argued that the massive amount of lay-offs created by state-owned firms during the initial phase of the transition can be interpreted as a signal directed to the banking sector in order to obtain more favourable financing conditions for the subsequent process of restructuring.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 9714.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
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