On the interpretation of evolutionarily stable sets
AbstractWe introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following requirements: After every sufficiently small mutation of a population playing a single strategy in the set: a) No single mutant strategy can spread. b) A single mutant strategy not in the set will be driven out. Depending on the precise interpretation of "a sufficiently small mutation" in these requirements we distinguish "simple ES sets", "pointwise uniform ES sets" and "uniform ES set". In contrast to the original definition of an ES set by Thomas (1985d) our definitions do not require the sets to be closed We show: 1) A uniform ES set is always an ES set as defined by Thomas. 2) For analytic fitness functions, and hence for all symmetric normal form games, the notions of pointwise uniform ES set and ES set coincide. 3) All four definitions of evolutionary stability for sets coincide in symmetric bimatrix games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 9710.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
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- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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- Daniel Friedman, 1998.
"On economic applications of evolutionary game theory,"
Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
- Daniel Friedman, 2010. "On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 53, David K. Levine.
- Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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