Repeating voting with complete information
AbstractA committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost of delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization of the seminal median voter theorem known from the simple majority case. If supermajority is required instead, then the power to select the outcome moves from the median voter to the more extreme voters. Normative analysis indicates that the simple majority is not constrained efficient because it does not reflect the strengths of voters' opinion. Even if unanimity is a bad voting rule, voting rules close to unanimity may be efficient. The more likely it is to have a very many almost indifferent voters and some very opinionated ones, the more stringent supermajority is required for efficiency
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 1110.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-05-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2012-05-29 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 189-221, 04.
- Philippe Jehiel & Oliver Compte, 2007. "Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000131, UCLA Department of Economics.
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