Group formation and competition: instrumental and expressive approaches
AbstractWe construct models of group formation designed to capture some of the key features of political and social competition. The models draw on the â€˜citizen candidateâ€™ approach and allow competition to be modelled as either compromise - where all groups influence outcomes; or conflict - where one group wins the right to dictate. We also consider both instrumental and expressive approaches to understanding group formation, first separately and then in a setting which encompasses both approaches. Keywords; group formation, expressive behaviour, conflict, compromise ISSN 0966-4246
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 0110.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2001
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