Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and credit market competition
AbstractIn this paper we analyse the effect of banks holding equity stakes in borrowing firms on the equilibrium level of interest rates and on the tendency of the borrowing firm to establish tighter links with the shareholding bank. Equity claims are defined as rights to receive dividend payments as well as private information about the firm. By modeling competition as an asymmetric common value auction, we show that when one of the competing banks in the credit market holds an equity claim in the firm, the equilibrium expected cost of debt increases with the size of the equity stake and the firm tends to concentrate his credit relationships around the shareholding bank
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 0022.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2000
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