The Devil's in the Tail: Residential Mortgage Finance and the U.S. Treasury
AbstractThis paper seeks to contribute to the U.S. housing finance reform conversation by providing a critical assessment of the various types of policy proposals that have been offered. There appears to be a broad consensus to maintain explicit government guarantees for certain narrowly defined borrower populations, such as Federal Housing Administration insurance guarantees for low- and moderate-income and first-time homebuyers. However, the expected role of the federal government in the broader housing finance system is in dispute. The expected role ranges from no role to insuring against only extreme or tail events to insuring against all losses. However, most proposals agree that any public insurance be priced and available only for loans meeting specified criteria to limit taxpayer exposure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 12-12.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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Other versions of this item:
- W. Scott Frame & Larry D. Wall & Lawrence J. White, 2012. "The devil's in the tail: residential mortgage finance and the U.S. Treasury," Working Paper 2012-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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