This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Why some Corporations Pay More Tax than Necessary

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Karl Ove Aarbu and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason () (Statistics Norway)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

It has been noticed in several countries that many corporations do not claim all of their allowable tax depreciation deductions, despite incurring a higher tax cost. There are several possible explanations. First, the uniform reporting accounting system (typical of many European countries) can under certain circumstances constrain dividends. The dividend constraint can, however, be loosened by forgoing some tax depreciation. We find no support for this hypothesis. Second, we find strong evidence that corporations with bad economic performance tend to underutilize their deductions, suggesting that corporations use costly “window-dressing” on their accounting measures. Third, we find support for the hypothesis that tax compliance costs discourage the utilization of accelerated depreciation, especially by small firms. Fourth, we find weak support for the hypothesis that there is substitution between tax depreciation and private debt due to competition between the benefits of private bank monitoring and the tax savings from using tax debt, as suggested in earlier literature. Our empirical analysis is possible due to unusual access to extremely detailed individual firm tax returns forms in Norway, combined with the 1992 Norwegian tax reform that provided a natural experiment for testing some of the hypotheses. We use the time-series and cross-sectional variation across Norwegian corporations in 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1993.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ssb.no/publikasjoner/DP/pdf/dp211.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 211.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:211

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O.Box 8131 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway
Phone: (+47) 21 09 00 00
Fax: (+47) 21 09 49 73
Email:
Web page: http://www.ssb.no
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (B Mellemstrand).

Related research
Keywords: Corporate taxes; Depreciation; Reporting conventions;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.