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Market Power, International CO2 Taxation and Petroleum Wealth

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Abstract

This paper studies the effects on fossil fuel prices, extraction paths and petroleum wealth of an international carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption. We present an intertemporal equilibrium model for fossil fuels, where the main focus is on the oil market. The impacts of a global carbon tax of $10 per barrel of oil depend heavily on the market structure in the oil market. If OPEC acts as a cartel, they reduce their production to maintain the oil price. Thus, the effects on the oil wealth of the competitive fringe is minor, while OPEC's oil wealth is considerably reduced. This may explain the difference in attitudes of OPEC and other oil producing countries to international global warming negotiations. If, on the other side, the oil market is competitive, the highest relative reductions in the oil wealth are to be found among non-OPEC producers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 170.

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Date of creation: Apr 1996
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Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:170

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Keywords: International Carbon Taxes; Exhaustible Resources; Petroleum Wealth.;

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Cited by:
  1. Elin Berg & Snorre Kverndokk & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 1999. "Optimal Oil Exploration under Climate Treaties," Discussion Papers 245, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  2. Finn Roar Aune & Snorre Kverndokk & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2005. "Profitability of different instruments in international climate policies," Discussion Papers 403, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  3. Kverndokk,S. & Rosendahl,E., 2000. "CO2 mitigation costs and ancillary benefits in the Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland : a survey," Memorandum 34/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  4. Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008. "How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, February.
  5. Berg, Elin & Kverndokk, Snorre & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 1998. "Gains from cartelisation in the oil market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 725-727, August.
  6. Einar Bowitz & Ådne Cappelen, 1997. "Incomes Policies and the Norwegian Economy 1973-93," Discussion Papers 192, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  7. Lars Lindholt, 2005. "Beyond Kyoto: backstop technologies and endogenous prices on CO2 permits and fossil fuels," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(17), pages 2019-2036.
  8. Finn Roar Aune & Solveig Glomsrød & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2005. "Are high oil prices profitable for OPEC in the long run?," Discussion Papers 416, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  9. Lars Lindholt, 1999. "Beyond Kyoto: CO2 permit prices and the markets for fossil fuels," Discussion Papers 258, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  10. Sverre Grepperud, 1997. "Soil Depletion Choices under Production and Price Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 186, Research Department of Statistics Norway.

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