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Decidability and manipulability in social choice

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Author Info

  • Gennaro Amendola
  • Luigi Marengo
  • Simona Settepanella

Abstract

We present a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority enjoys a vast power of determining the social outcome, as locally or globally stable social optima can be created or eliminated. At the same time, by bundling and unbundling elements, it is also possible to greatly increase or decrease decidability both because the likelihood of intransitive cycles varies and because the time required to reach a social optimum varies. In this paper we present a rigorous framework which allows us to study this trade-off between decidability and non-manipulability.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy in its series LEM Papers Series with number 2012/11.

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Date of creation: 03 Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2012/11

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Related research

Keywords: Social choice; agenda; object construction; hyperplane arrangement; directed graphs; algorithm;

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References

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  1. Luigi Marengo & Simona Settepanella, 2010. "Social choice among complex objects," LEM Papers Series 2010/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  2. Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2010. "The construction of choice. A computational voting model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3077-3087.
  3. Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 12720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Callander, Steven & Wilson, Catherine H., 2006. "Context-dependent Voting," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 227-254, July.
  5. Luigi Maregno & Corrado Pasquali, 2008. "A computational voting model," LEM Papers Series 2008/24, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
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Cited by:
  1. Gennaro Amendola & Luigi Marengo & Davide Pirino & Simona Settepanella & Akimichi Takemura, 2013. "Decidability in complex social choices," LEM Papers Series 2013/21, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.

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