A Dynamical Approach to Conflict Analysis
AbstractThe Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response strategy is thus defined based on this projection, adding additional stability conditions to strategic choice and increasing the set of potential equilibria beyond pure Nash equilibria. Yet, the original Conflict Analysis approach lacks the ability to genuinely model dynamic repeated games, in which past play defines the condition for future interactions. This article will illustrate how the original model can be adapted to include endogenous individual preferences that are defined by the strategic choice of players during past play, allowing to model the reciprocal connection between preferential change and best response play in repeated games. A dummy game serves as an exemplar and helps to visualise the results obtained from this extension.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy in its series LEM Papers Series with number 2012/05.
Date of creation: 13 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Game Theory; Repeated Games; Computational Methods; Non-Nash Equilibria; Dominated Strategies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-02-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-02-20 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Giovanni Dosi & Mike Hobday & Luigi Marengo, 2000. "Problem-Solving Behaviours, Organisational Forms and the Complexity of Tasks," LEM Papers Series 2000/06, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Giorgio Fagiolo & Giovanni Dosi, 2002.
"Exploitation, Exploration and Innovation in a Model of Endogenous Growth with Locally interacting Agents,"
LEM Papers Series
2002/25, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Fagiolo, Giorgio & Dosi, Giovanni, 2003. "Exploitation, exploration and innovation in a model of endogenous growth with locally interacting agents," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 237-273, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.