Social choice on complex objects: A geometric approach
AbstractMarengo and Pasquali (2008) present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of individual preferences and social aggregation based on hyperplanes and their arrangements. As an application of this model we give a necessary condition for existence of a local social optimum. Moreover we address the question if a social decision rule depends also upon the number of voting agents. More precisely: are there social decision rules that can be obtained by an odd (even) number of voting agent which cannot be obtained by only three (two) voting agent? The answer is negative. Indeed three (or two) voting agent can produce all possible social decision rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy in its series LEM Papers Series with number 2008/28.
Date of creation: 03 Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intransitive cycles; arrangements; graph theory.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-12-07 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2008-12-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2008-12-07 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-GTH-2008-12-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-12-07 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Luigi Maregno & Corrado Pasquali, 2008. "A computational voting model," LEM Papers Series 2008/24, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2011.
"The construction of choice: a computational voting model,"
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination,
Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 139-156, November.
- Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2010. "The construction of choice. A computational voting model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 3077-3087.
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