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Politiques monétaires : est-ce le début de la fin ?

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Author Info

  • Céline Antonin

    (OFCE)

  • Christophe Blot

    (OFCE)

  • Paul Hubert
  • Fabien Labondance

    (Atelier de recherche sur la politique économique et la gestion des entreprises (ARPEGE))

  • Catherine Mathieu

    (OFCE)

  • Christine Rifflart

    (OFCE)

  • Vincent Touze

    (OFCE)

Abstract

Depuis 2009, les principales banques centrales mettent en oeuvre des politiques monétaires expansionnistes afin de stimuler l'activité économique, réduire les risques de spirale déflationniste et soutenir le système financier. Ces politiques se sont traduites par des taux d'intérêt fixés à leur plus bas niveau ou presque et par des mesures non conventionnelles. L'amélioration récente du climat conjoncturel et la volonté affichée des banques centrales d'organiser le retrait progressif des mesures non conventionnelles posent la question d'une éventuelle normalisation des politiques monétaires. Pour autant, toute hausse des taux d'intérêt d'ici 2014 est exclue. En effet, le risque inflationniste est inexistant et la croissance anticipée trop modérée pour entraîner une baisse rapide du taux de chômage. Or, la Réserve fédérale et la Banque d'Angleterre ont conditionné un relèvement du taux d'intérêt à une cible de taux de chômage. Cette politique de communication (forward guidance ou orientation prospective) relative aux taux d'intérêt a pour objectif d'ancrer les anticipations de taux et de fournir par ce biais un soutien à la croissance. Cette stratégie accompagne l'ensemble des mesures non conventionnelles de nature plus quantitatives telles que les programmes d'achat de titre ou les opérations exceptionnelles de refinancement du système bancaire. La normalisation des opérations de politique monétaire passe par un retrait progressif de ces mesures non conventionnelles. Mais l'annonce de Ben Bernanke d'un éventuel ralentissement progressif du rythme des achats de titres par la Réserve fédérale a provoqué de la volatilité sur les marchés et une augmentation rapide des taux à long terme. Dès lors, les banques centrales doivent faire preuve d'une grande prudence afin d'éviter une normalisation trop hâtive des politiques monétaires. Ceci d'autant plus que les risques associés à ces mesures (développement de nouvelles bulles, indépendance des banques centrales ou risques inflationnistes) ne paraissent pas être aujourd'hui la principale menace dans les pays industrialisés (...).

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Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oasij6sc6.

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Date of creation: Oct 2013
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Publication status: Published in Revue de l'OFCE - Analyse et prévisions, 2013, pp.223-262
Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oasij6sc6

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