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The Demand for Student-Athlete Labor and the Supply of Violations in the NCAA

Author

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  • Jill Harris

    (Department of Economics, University of Redlands)

Abstract

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) acts as a cartel with monopsony power in the market for student-athletes. This paper models the demand for student-athlete labor using a Mill-Edgeworth-Marshall reciprocal demand model. The reciprocal demand translates into a supply of violations (or cheating) on the NCAA cartel agreement. A theoretical foundation for this simultaneous system is created and an empirical model is estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator on violations data from Division IA basketball, baseball, and football programs from 5 conferences. Results suggest market power is significant in explaining some of the variation in the supply of violations. Since detecting and deterring cheating is costly, information about the supply of violations is useful.

Suggested Citation

  • Jill Harris, 2011. "The Demand for Student-Athlete Labor and the Supply of Violations in the NCAA," Working Papers 1115, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:1115
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    File URL: http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/Harris_NCAAViolations.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    7. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Lawrence M. Kahn, 2007. "Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 209-226, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 2018. "Strategic Interaction in a Repeated Game: Evidence from NCAA Football Recruiting," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(2), pages 283-303, March.
    2. Jill S. Harris, 2018. "State of Play: How Do College Football Programs Compete for Student Athletes?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(2), pages 269-281, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NCAA; monopsony rent; cartel; reciprocal demand; cheating;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets

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