Subsidized Monopolists and Product Prices: The Case of Major League Baseball
AbstractIn this paper, I analyze the setting of ticket prices when teams receive subsidization from the public. I model teams as entertainment providers, where entertainment is generated by selling wins and amenities. I argue that subsidization of teams generally comes from subsidizing the amenities in and surrounding the teams’ stadiums. Subsidization of the amenities lowers the marginal cost of providing them to fans and should drive ticket prices lower. The empirical analysis suggests that this is the case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists in its series Working Papers with number 0629.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2006-11-25 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-SPO-2006-11-25 (Sports & Economics)
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