Endogenizing Private Information: Incentive Contracts under Learning By Doing
AbstractThis paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what drives the over- or under-exploitation of learning effects is whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through learning effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at all, in a sense to be made precise.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich in its series SOI - Working Papers with number 0413.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
asymmetric information; learning by doing; regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-12 (All new papers)
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- Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2008.
"Dynamic Regulation of Quality,"
Cahiers de recherche
08-11, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
- Auray, Stéphane & Mariotti, Thomas & Moizeau, Fabien, 2007. "Dynamic Regulation of Quality," IDEI Working Papers 397, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- StÃ©phane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2011. "Dynamic regulation of quality," Working Papers 245736, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2006.
"Dynamic Regulation of Public Good Quality,"
Cahiers de recherche
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