Two Impossibility Results on the Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining
Abstract
We present two impossibility results on the converse consistency principle in the context of bargaining. First, we show that there is no solution satis-fying Pareto optimality, contraction independence, and converse consistency. Next, we show that there is no solution satisfying Pareto optimality, strong individual rationality, individual monotonicity, and converse consistency.Download Info
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University in its series Working Paper Series with number no24.Length:
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no24
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Related research
Keywords: bargaining problem; axiomatic approach; impossibilities; converse consistency;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-11-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2000-01-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-1999-11-08 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-1999-11-08 (Microeconomics)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Youngsub Chun, 2001. "The Separability Principle in Bargaining," Working Paper Series no43, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
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