We present two impossibility results on the converse consistency principle in the context of bargaining. First, we show that there is no solution satis-fying Pareto optimality, contraction independence, and converse consistency. Next, we show that there is no solution satisfying Pareto optimality, strong individual rationality, individual monotonicity, and converse consistency.
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University in its series Working Paper Series with number
no24.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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