Salience, Coordination and Cooperation in Contributing to Threshold Public Goods
AbstractWe present results from a multiple public goods experiment, where each public good produces benefits only if total contributions to it reach a minimum threshold. The experiment allows us to compare subjects' behavior in a benchmark treatment with a single public good and in treatments with more public goods than can be funded. We show how the availability of additional, more-efficient public goods may not make subjects better off. This is because additional options decrease the probability of coordination and discourage contributions. Introducing additional, less-efficient options does not alter coordination and contributions relative to the benchmark.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy in its series ISLA Working Papers with number 44.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.isla.unibocconi.it/
threshold public goods; multiple public goods; salience; efficiency; laboratory experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-05-22 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-05-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-05-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2012-05-22 (Public Economics)
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