We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant strategy of the adversary (the offering player), is investigated. It turns out that the order imposed by the player's rational preferences can be intransitive. The presented quantitative results imply a revision of the "common sense" opinions stating that preferences showing intransitivity are paradoxical and undesired.
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Paper provided by University of Bialtystok, Department of Theoretical Physics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
20.
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