On Measuring Influence in Non-Binary Voting Games
AbstractIn this note, we demonstrate using two simple examples that generalization of the Banzhaf measure of voter influence to non-binary voting games that requires as starting position a voter’s membership in a winning coalition is likely to incompletely reflect the influence a voter has on the outcome of a game. Generalization of the Banzhaf measure that takes into consideration all possible pivot moves of a voter including those moves originating from a losing coalition will, on the other hand, result in a measure that is proportional to the Penrose measure only in the ternary case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Singapore Management University, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 25-2004.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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- NEP-CDM-2006-10-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
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