Quasi-option Value under Strategic Interactions
AbstractWe consider a simple two-period model with irreversible investment with strategic interactions. In this setup, we try to extend the concept of the quasi-option value (QOV) by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1987) and Hanemann (1989) to a game-theoretic situation. In doing so, we demostrate some conceptual difficulties with the QOV, and stress the potential importance of information-induced inefficiency. We also show that this inefficiency can be remedied by incorporating sophisticated control of information flow. Our model is potentially applicable to various global environmental problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Singapore Management University, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-2011.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2011-09-05 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-09-05 (Game Theory)
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