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Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program

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Author Info

  • Yuichiro Kamada

    ()
    (Harvard University)

  • Fuhito Kojima

    ()
    (Stanford University)

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    Abstract

    In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents to rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced "regional caps" which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. The government modifi ed the deferred acceptance mechanism incorporating the regional caps. This paper shows that the current mechanism may result in avoidable ineffciency and instability and proposes a better mechanism that improves upon it in terms of effciency and stability while meeting the regional caps. More broadly, the paper contributes to the general research agenda of matching and market design to address practical problems.

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    File URL: http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/10-011.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-011.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-011

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    Related research

    Keywords: medical residency matching; regional caps; the rural hospital theorem; sta- bility; strategy-proofness; matching with contracts;

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    Cited by:
    1. Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler & Alexander Westkamp, 2012. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis," Kiel Working Papers 1761, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    2. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2014. "The efficiency of labor matching and remuneration reforms: a panel data quantile regression approach with endogenous treatment variables," Working Papers w0206, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

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