Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Delivery: New Conclusions from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
AbstractThis paper replicates Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin’s (1999) analysis of the effect of physician financial incentives on cesarean delivery rates, using their data, sample selection criteria, and specification. Coincident trends explain much of their estimated positive relation between fees and cesarean utilization, which also falls somewhat upon the inclusion of several childbirth observations that had been inadvertently excluded from their estimation sample. The data ultimately indicate that a $1000 increase, in current dollars, in the reimbursement for a cesarean section increases cesarean delivery rates by about one percentage point, one-quarter of the effect estimated originally.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business in its series Working Papers with number 0801.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Grant, Darren, 2009. "Physician financial incentives and cesarean delivery: New conclusions from the healthcare cost and utilization project," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 244-250, January.
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