This paper replaces the conventional view of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a strategic approach based on the theory of repeated games, where input contributions and side payments are self-enforcing.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University in its series Discussion Papers with number
dp97-06.
Length: 47 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp97-06
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada Phone: (778)782-3508 Fax: (778)782-5944 Web page: http://www.econ.sfu.ca/ More information through EDIRC