Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX
AbstractBy custom, in several different regions of Europe tenants were the owners of the improvements they carried out on the farm. As a result of such customs, rents usually remained below the Ricardian equilibrium over long periods of time and therefore cannot be used to calculate the total factor productivity in agriculture. This paper examines the logic underlying the functioning of the custom that came into being in nineteenth-century Valencia. This is followed by a brief comparison between the Valencia custom, the Irish tenant right and the French mauvais gré.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria in its series Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria with number 1009.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
tenants; improvements; property rights; Valencia; mauvais gré;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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- Guinnane, Timothy W. & Miller, Ronald I., 1996.
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- McCloskey, Donald N., 1991. "The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(02), pages 343-355, June.
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