Access Profit-Sharing Regulation with Information Transmission and Acquisition
AbstractThe paper analyses how information acquisition and transmission issues affect the determination of the optimal access pro.t-sharing plan in regulated network industries. It considers a regulated upstream monopoly with cost uncertainty and a downstream unregulated duopoly. It will be shown that, under an access price cap regulatory mechanism, the transfer of a sufficiently high share of access profits to consumers induces an integrated upstream monopolist to transmit to his downstream rival the information privately acquired on the upstream cost and this, in turn, may negatively affect welfare. On account of these effects the optimal access profit-sharing plan will depend on the variance and shape of cost distribution, on information acquisition costs as well as on the regulator’s redistributive concerns.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 214.
Date of creation: 05 Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Access price cap regulation; profit-sharing; information transmission and acquisition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-02-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-REG-2009-02-22 (Regulation)
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