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Designing of research coalitions in promoting GEOSS. A brief overview of the literature

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  • Christine Heumesser

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    (Institute for Sustainable Economic Development, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna)

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    Abstract

    The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) links a variety of existing and future observation systems and forecasting models into one comprehensive system of systems to provide accurate environmental data and to enable an encompassing vision and understanding of the Earth system. GEOSS is based on voluntary efforts, and shall be made accessible freely or at a very low cost, such that it bears properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability and can be compared with a public good. Agreements on the provision of a public good often suffer low participation. We apply a game theoretical approach to analyze GEOSS as a research coalition with varying spillover rates, in order to figure out whether a coalition with full participation can exist in equilibrium. We also focus on the question how varying spillover rates influence the size of the equilibrium coalition and suggest two measures, which can increase participation in equilibrium. The revision of the literature shows that the full participation is socially optimal and spillovers which take the form of strategic complements can lead to a high level of cooperation. Also measures like the linkage of negotiations and the formation of multiple coalitions can achieve a high level of participation.

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    File URL: ftp://ftp.boku.ac.at/pub/repecftpg/repecftp/RePEc/sed/wpaper/402008.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Institute for Sustainable Economic Development, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna in its series Working Papers with number 402008.

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    Length: 42 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:sed:wpaper:402008

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    Related research

    Keywords: coalition theory; research coalitions; public goods;

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    References

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    1. Cassiman, Bruno, 2000. "Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 283-314, February.
    2. Yi, Sang-Seung & Shin, Hyukseung, 2000. "Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 229-256, February.
    3. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    5. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori, 2003. "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations," Working Papers 2003.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., . "On the stability of collusive price leadership," CORE Discussion Papers RP -522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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