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Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland: Problems and Trends

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  • Piotr Kozarzewski

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the problems of the impact of privatization on corporate governance formation in Poland. It discusses the dilemmas of choosing a model for privatization and corporate governance, legal background, mechanisms of corporate governance formation depending on a privatization method applied, and the evolution of these structures in the course of systemic transformation in Poland. The Author comes to the conclusion that the processes of privatization and corporate governance formation in Poland are marked by both successes and failures. The most spectacular success is privatization in the “broad sense” which boosted the growth of new private businesses and the share of the private sector in the national economy. Privatization in the “narrow sense” (ownership transformation of state-owned enterprises) was only a partial success, both in terms of quantity and quality. Some methods of privatization proved to be more “permeable,” easier to implement for a number of social, political and technical reasons than the others; thus, the progress of privatization was very uneven across sectors, and some of them (infrastructure, extractive industries and some others) remain predominantly stateowned. There were two reasons for this situation: the highly gradualist, consensual character of Polish privatization procedures and the emergence of interest groups not interested in privatization of remaining state-controlled companies. Recently, new trends are seen that can be interpreted as a certain convergence of corporate governance models and a convergence between the effects of different privatization methods in corporate governance and performance of enterprises. Taking this into account, the Author elaborates on whether the “how to privatize” question still actual and on the “feasibility vs. efficiency” privatization policy dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Piotr Kozarzewski, 2006. "Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland: Problems and Trends," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0325, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0325
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacek Kochanowicz & Piotr Kozarzewski & Richard Woodward, 2005. "Understanding Reform: The Case of Poland," CASE Network Reports 0059, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    2. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "Privatizing Russia," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522284, December.
    3. Piotr Kozarzewski & Richard Woodward, 2003. "Poland I: Ownership and Performance of Firms Privatised by Management-Employee Buyouts," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Barbara Błaszczyk & Iraj Hoshi & Richard Woodward (ed.), Secondary Privatisation in Transition Economies, chapter 3, pages 91-122, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Murrell Peter & Wang Yijiang, 1993. "When Privatization Should Be Delayed: The Effect of Communist Legacies on Organizational and Institutional Reforms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 385-406, June.
    5. Barbara Błaszczyk & Iraj Hoshi & Richard Woodward (ed.), 2003. "Secondary Privatisation in Transition Economies," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-37701-1.
    6. Piotr Kozarzewski, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Secondary Privatisation in Poland: Legal Framework and Changes in Ownership Structure," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0263, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nina Cankar & Simon Deakin & Marko Simoneti, 2008. "The Reflexive Properties of Corporate Governance Codes: The Reception of the 'Comply or Explain' Approach in Slovenia," Working Papers wp371, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.

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