Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions
AbstractUS government agencies in WIC infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. This paper investigates whether bidders are more aggressive when buyers band together to jointly offer infant formula contracts. Results suggest that WIC agencies that band together to form an alliance receive stronger bids.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by South Dakota State University, Department of Economics in its series SDSU Working Papers in Progress with number 12011.
Length: pages 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
auctions; food assistance; countervailing power; buyer concentration; oligopoly; WIC;
Other versions of this item:
- Davis, David E., 2011. "Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 123863, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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