Myopia in Marketing Channel: A Differential Game Analysis
AbstractThe paper investigates the impact of retailer's myopic behavior on the strategies and outcomes of channel members. Myopia means that the retailer disregards the evolution of the state of the system when optimizing her payoff. The channel is formed of a single manufacturer selling her product through an exclusive retailer. The manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the advertising rate in the brand equity and the retailer the local promotional effort and the retail price. Feedback Nash equilibria are sought for the two scenarios, i.e., with a myopic retailer and a far-sighted one. Since the equilibria turn out to be not amenable to a qualitative analysis, we design a series of simulations to analyze the impact of key model's parameters on strategies and outcomes, as well as to assess the impact of myopia on them
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 with number 515.
Date of creation: 04 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
differential games; marketing channels; myopia;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.